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What effect do power-sharing institutions agreed to as part of civil war settlements have on the development of the rule of law
in post–civil war states? We contend that power-sharing measures facilitate the emergence of the rule of law in two ways. First,
they establish a form of institutional constraint that promotes judicial autonomy and independence. Second, they foster a
sense of security among judges and other political actors that bolsters commitment to the law. We demonstrate the plausibility
of a positive relationship between power sharing and the rule of law through an analysis of post–civil war states between the
years 1948 and 2006. Our findings suggest that civil war settlements can help to establish the rule of law when they include
mechanisms aimed at allaying the insecurities of political actors in the postconflict environment.

A significant body of scholarship finds that a commitment
to the rule of law helps stabilize peace in countries emerging from civil war. The international community now incorporates strengthening the rule of law into its efforts to prevent such countries from sliding back into armed conflict.
Although efforts to reestablish or strengthen the rule of law
in these countries have spawned a “rule of law industry,” research suggests that these endeavors have been largely unsuccessful.1 Explanations for the failure of reform programs
to help effect the rule of law include their “apolitical” and
“technical” nature (Mani 1998), as well as a reliance on imported legal models ill-suited to countries that often lack a
democratic tradition (Upham 2002).2
In light of the struggles that reform programs have experienced in helping postconflict states to establish functioning rule-of-law systems, this study explores another means
that might assist countries in this endeavor. We consider the
potential that power-sharing institutions, adopted as part of
civil war settlements, have to encourage the development
of the rule of law in the aftermath of an intrastate war. We
posit that there are two means by which power sharing helps
to establish the foundations for an effective system of rule of
law. First, by addressing the security concerns of civil war rivals, power-sharing institutions enhance the willingness of
political actors to help create and operate within a rule-oflaw environment. Second, and perhaps most importantly,
by providing different forms of checks and balances, powersharing institutions serve to restrain politically dominant actors. More specifically, the effect of these mechanisms is to
provide judges, the actors at the center of our theory, with
the will and ability to exercise a degree of judicial indepenCaroline A. Hartzell is a professor of political science at Gettysburg College.
Her research focuses on civil war resolution and the effects ending civil war has
on the quality of the peace.
Matthew Hoddie is a professor of political science at Towson University. His
research focuses on the topics of ethnic conflict and civil war resolution.
1
The phrase “rule-of-law industry” appears in Hurwitz (2008, 2).
2
These criticisms of the efforts by third parties to promote the rule of law
in post–civil war states are also voiced by Haggard and Tiede (2014, 414), who
note that, “[n]ot only do outside supporters of the rule of law often lack adequate
commitment and resources, but they may make proposals that do not at all fit
with lived experience and thus prove fragile as a result.”

dence they would otherwise not likely display in a post–civil
war setting.
This study takes a distinctive approach to the study of the
rule of law in the context of post–civil war states. Earlier studies generally have considered the rule of law as an explanatory variable that conditions the prospects for postconflict
stability. In contrast, we consider the rule of law as a dependent variable and seek to identify the factors central to its
establishment in states emerging from armed conflict.
We divide this article into seven sections. We first define
the rule of law concept and consider its significance for postconflict states. We next describe the difficulties that states
emerging from civil war face in developing a functioning
rule-of-law system. In the third section, we introduce our
theory regarding the effects the adoption of power-sharing
institutions has on the rule of law. Sections that describe
our research design and the findings of our empirical test
follow. We also report the results from a series of robustness tests, including an examination of the potential for
endogeneity bias to affect our findings. We then consider
the case of post–civil war Liberia in order to explore the
validity of the mechanisms through which we argue power
sharing impacts the rule of law. We conclude with some observations regarding our analysis and suggestions for future
research.

The Rule of Law: What It Is and Why It Matters for
Postconflict States
Scholars vary considerably in their definitions of the rule
of law. Perhaps the most significant difference among them
is whether they favor a “thin” or “thick” understanding of
the concept. “Thin,” “formal,” or “minimalist” conceptions
of rule of law emphasize that these are transparent, publicly announced rules that are binding on the government.
These rules provide citizens with the ability “to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers
in given circumstances.”3 This understanding of the rule of
law is thus less concerned with the content of the laws than
3

The quote, which is from Friedrich von Hayek (1968), is cited in Mani (2008,

23).
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with assuring that they are predictable and nonarbitrary
(Skaaning 2010, 451; Mani 2008, 27). “Thick,” “substantive,”
or “maximalist” definitions of the rule of law, on the other
hand, extend to the substantive content of rules or laws.
Scholars who adopt this definition see formal justice as intertwined with social justice and, accordingly, evaluate ruleof-law systems on the basis of their ability to advance the
rights of individuals (Mani 2008).
We adopt a minimalist or process-oriented definition of
the rule of law for a number of reasons. First, we believe
a minimalist understanding is most appropriate for states
emerging from civil war given the concerns held by state
and nonstate actors in that environment. Actors who only recently participated in armed violence are more likely to be
concerned about who will exercise control over the state’s
law-and-order forces and how these forces will be used vis-àvis particular groups than the content of laws that may impact individuals’ rights. Second, we deem a minimalist form
of the rule of law as the one that is most feasible for actors to
construct in the immediate aftermath of civil war. Finally, we
believe that it makes sense to exclude elements (e.g., social
rights) from our definition that one might instead examine
as outputs or factors conditioned by the rule of law.
It also bears noting that judicial independence, the indicator we employ for the rule of law, can be considered “thin”
in nature; as such, it maps nicely on to our minimalist understanding of the rule of law. As Melton and Ginsburg (2014,
190) observe of the rule of law, “at its core, it involves the
ability and willingness of courts to decide cases in light of
the law without undue regard to the view of other government actors.”
Scholars often distinguish between de jure and de facto
judicial independence when identifying the factors that
make it feasible for a judiciary to act in this fashion. De
jure judicial independence consists of formal rules that promote autonomy by insulating judges from undue pressure.
De facto judicial independence exists when “judges resolve
cases in ways that reflect their sincere preferences” and
“these decisions are enforced in practice even when political
actors would rather not comply” (Ríos-Figueroa and Staton
2012, 107).
We focus on de facto rather than de jure judicial independence as our indicator of rule of law. The types of rules
associated with de jure independence (e.g., budgetary autonomy and fixed tenure for judges) assume a level of institutional structure and coherence that are unlikely to exist
in a post–civil war context. Rather than focusing on a set of
formal rules, de facto judicial independence is a behavioral
concept (Ríos-Figueroa and Staton 2012). Its use makes it
feasible to explore whether different types of institutional
arrangements (e.g., power sharing) can help to promote the
behaviors associated with higher levels of rule of law.
A definition of the rule of law consistent with the minimalist understanding we employ appears in the work of José
María Maravall and Adam Przeworski (2003, 3). They characterize the concept in the following terms:
The rule of law emerges when . . . self-interested
rulers willingly restrain themselves and make their
behavior predictable in order to obtain a sustained,
voluntary cooperation of well-organized groups commanding valuable resources. In exchange for such
cooperation, rulers will protect the interest of these
groups by legal means.
This definition appears particularly apt because, in the
words of Hurwitz (2008, 10), it conceptualizes the rule of
law “as a mechanism of power distribution between political

forces and state institutions.” Following a civil war, this distribution of power is one of the central issues of concern to
groups. Collectivities that recently have engaged in violence
against one another worry about the possibility that any single group will monopolize state power and promote its own
interests while threatening the security of others (Hartzell
and Hoddie 2007). In this environment, arrangements that
distribute power in such a way as to preclude this outcome
may be as important as other aspects of rule of law that tend
to garner more attention, such as equality in the application
of laws to all citizens.
Establishing a functioning rule-of-law system has the potential to play a vital role in assisting postwar states to build
a durable peace. The literature that links the rule of law and
post–civil war stability provides some support for this view.
For example, research finds that countries with high-quality
rule of law systems are less vulnerable to civil war onset
(Taydas, Peksen, and James 2010). Studies also suggest that
the rule of law provides communities with means by which
to resolve their grievances and disputes peacefully, thereby
helping to ensure that conflicts do not escalate to the level
of armed violence (DeRouen and Goldfinch 2012). Finally,
research identifies high-quality rule of law as a factor that
reduces the incidence of armed intrastate conflict by contributing to good governance (Hegre and Nygård 2014).4

Establishing the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Civil
War
Reflecting the international community’s belief that a robust rule of law can help promote security, democracy, development, and human rights, rule-of-law programs are now
typically designed to advance all of these goals simultaneously in postconflict states. Although efforts to foster the
rule of law date back several decades, the multipronged approach is largely a post–cold war phenomenon, with ruleof-law programs becoming a central component of United
Nations (UN) peace operations since 1999 (O’Neill 2008).
How successful have international efforts to help postconflict or fragile countries establish the rule of law been?
A literature review that assessed more than two decades of
rule-of-law programming concluded that rule-of-law strategies had produced few lasting results (Samuels 2006). The
review partially attributes this lack of success to the absence
of “basic agreement on the goals of rule-of-law reform, on
how different aspects should be sequenced to avoid them
working against each other, and fundamentally what sorts
of strategies are effective” (Samuels 2006, i). These problems are compounded by the lack of systematic evaluations
of rule-of-law reforms (Carter 2013).
An oft-mentioned criticism of programs that attempt to
help build the rule of law in postconflict states is their failure
to give sufficient consideration to the conditions that prevail in such countries. International actors understand that
they are operating in an environment in which institutions
and infrastructure have been decimated, judges and other
legal professionals have been killed or fled the country, and
society is divided. Despite this knowledge, rule-of-law reformers often appear to disregard or discount the political
dynamics in place at the end of the war and the insecurities these engender. Rather than thinking strategically about
the types of institutions needed to overcome the deficit of
trust produced by such conditions, practitioners tend to
recreate the institutional frameworks that they associate with
4
Each of these studies defines and operationalizes the rule of law in a very
different manner.
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effective rule of law in the West (Samuels 2006; Mani 2008).
It is little wonder that these rule of law institutions fail to
become self-enforcing. Only when institutions help to address the pressing concerns felt by actors emerging from
civil war is it possible to build a stable foundation for the rule
of law.

Theory: How Power Sharing Can Help to Establish the
Rule of Law
We posit that power-sharing institutions established at the
conclusion of a civil war have the potential to facilitate the
emergence of the rule of law in the years following the war’s
end. As we describe below, power-sharing institutions accomplish this by providing key political actors with a degree
of security that makes them more willing to develop and act
within the rule of law and by restraining politically dominant actors. Although we consider these mechanisms central to the process of constructing the rule of law, we do not
claim that they will produce a fully developed rule-of-law system. Rather, we maintain that relatively stronger rule-of-law
systems will emerge in those countries whose civil war settlements call for a range of power-sharing measures in comparison to those states that adopt no or limited types of power
sharing.
Forms of Power Sharing

Consistent with previous studies, we define power-sharing
institutions as “rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate
decision-making rights, including access to state resources,
among collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell and
Hoddie 2003, 320). A component of many settlements designed to end civil wars, power-sharing measures distribute
various elements of state power among rival groups, thus
helping to ensure that no single collectivity controls all of
the levers of state power.
We focus on four key dimensions of power sharing: the
political, military, territorial, and economic aspects of government authority. Political power sharing calls for groups to
distribute central state authority in a proportional manner.
A proportional strategy requires groups to share power on
the basis of a demographic (e.g., ethnicity) or political (e.g.,
ideology) characteristic. This distribution of power takes
place through the use of electoral proportional representation, administrative proportional representation, or proportional representation in the executive branch of the national
government. Military power sharing aims to distribute authority within the security apparatus of the state. Means used to
accomplish this include merging adversaries’ armed forces
into a unified state security force; giving key leadership positions within the newly united security forces to members
of the weaker armed group; or, although this rarely occurs,
allowing the nonstate actor to retain its arms or to keep
its security forces. Territorial power sharing occurs in those
cases in which a postwar state is structured along federal
lines or provisions are made for regional autonomy. In both
instances, the goal is to provide regionally based groups
with some degree of power independent of that of the central government. Finally, economic power sharing seeks to distribute wealth and income among groups in such a way as to
prevent any one group from dominating state-controlled
economic resources. Means of achieving this include designing preferential policies or rules that call for the distribution of economic resources among rival groups (Weiner
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1983), assigning ownership of a natural resource to a region within the postwar state, and giving responsibility for
state-controlled resources to a group representative by appointing her to a commensurate position in the government
(Hartzell 2016).
Are particular dimensions of power sharing likely to play
a more significant role than others in the development of
the rule of law? While we test for this possibility, our view
is that the different dimensions of power sharing are mutually reinforcing and that post–civil war countries are most
likely to promote the rule of law when war-ending settlements include multiple forms of power sharing. The logic
behind this claim is twofold. First, because insecurity can be
experienced along multiple dimensions in postconflict societies, designing various means of addressing these forms
of insecurity can help to make actors feel more secure. Not
all forms of power sharing will be appropriate in every postconflict context. However, by agreeing to multiple types of
power sharing, groups know that, should one type of power
sharing fail, other measures can help check the power of
their rivals (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 37).5 For example,
while military power sharing is one means that can be used
to enhance a sense of security among rivals, should this form
of power sharing be absent or its implementation prove incomplete, other forms can bolster adversaries’ feelings of security. These might take forms such as empowering groups
to govern their homeland or ensuring they exercise greater
control over the exploitation of natural resources. In this
sense, all aspects of power sharing have the potential to provide assurances to groups that will enhance their security.
Second, the more power-sharing institutions a settlement
calls for, the more constrained governments should be in
their ability to use state power to advance their own ends
and/or harm others.
Power Sharing and Promotion of the Rule of Law

How do power-sharing structures help to advance the rule
of law? More specifically, how does power sharing promote
judicial independence, the concept we identify as central to
our understanding of the rule of law? We identify two means
via which power sharing can increase judges’ willingness to
adjudicate cases without unwarranted consideration of the
positions of other government actors (Melton and Ginsburg
2014). First, power-sharing measures can help to enhance
the security of actors who constitute part of the apparatus
of the state. Arrangements that call for sharing or dividing
the political, military, territorial, and economic powers of
the state among civil war rivals ensure that no single group
representative will be in a position to control the reins of
state power. Such arrangements also reassure political actors that those levers of authority cannot be used to threaten
their very existence or to impose some other unacceptable
cost (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). By providing a measure of
security, power-sharing measures create an environment in
which rivals have less need to worry that the power of the
state may be used by others to exploit their safety or other
vital interests. Power sharing thus helps contribute to the
emergence of a situation in postwar states in which elites,
realizing that “the benefit of regulations on the behavior of
others outweighs the cost of regulations on their own behavior” (Durant and Weintraub 2014, 527), become more
willing to observe the rule of law.
5
Territorial power sharing, for example, will only be appropriate in contexts
in which groups are geographically segregated.
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We expect the security-enhancing effects of power sharing
to have a positive effect on judicial autonomy. Judges’ willingness to exercise judicial independence should increase
to the extent that they believe they function within a more
secure political environment. This follows even if a judge
herself is not a member of a minority group that has gained
greater protections by being included in the apparatus of
the state. As long as judges believe that power-sharing measures make it more difficult for institutional actors to use the
power of the state to target others, they should have more
freedom to issue rulings without having to consider how others might perceive those rulings and what that might imply
for their well-being. Additionally, judges are likely to observe
that the security provided by a power-sharing arrangement
has the effect of increasing other institutional actors’ willingness to abide by the rule of law. This should have the
effect of persuading judges to decide cases on the basis of
the law, as they have increased confidence that their rulings
are unlikely to be overturned or challenged.
A second means by which power-sharing measures help
build the rule of law in postwar societies is by providing a
means of checking and balancing government power, a factor that is central in establishing the rule of law (Helmke
and Rosenbluth 2009; Melton and Ginsburg 2014). Although the types of checks and balances inherent in power
sharing may appear rudimentary, especially when compared
to those that exist in mature democracies, power-sharing institutions help restrain politically dominant actors by dividing state power among different groups. This is particularly
likely to be true of the executive, the actor that typically exercises the most influence over the judicial branch in states
emerging from civil war. By dividing or fragmenting government to some meaningful extent, power sharing makes it
more likely that the “law is unavailable as an instrument of
control by any particular actor” (Helmke and Rosenbluth
2009, 348). As a result, judges, aware of the institutional constraints that power sharing imposes on other government
actors, will have more autonomy to decide cases in light of
the law.
Power sharing and the rule of law operationalized in
terms of de facto judicial independence are distinctive concepts. The types of power-sharing measures the representatives of warring parties agree to should not be conflated with
the kinds of formal rules and practices that typically allow
judges to exercise judicial independence. Civil war rivals do
not agree to adopt power-sharing measures for the purpose
of establishing the rule of law. Nevertheless, some level of
judicial autonomy is likely to arise as an unintended effect
of such agreements. Judges who know that a framework of
rules exists that places limits on the use of state power and
who benefit from the sense of security that those rules provide should be more willing and able to assert some degree
of judicial independence. We now turn to our tests of the
relationship we posit between power sharing and de facto
judicial independence.

Research Design
We employ a time-series-cross-section data set. The data set
covers the time period 1948–2006. Our analysis includes
only those years in which a country remains at peace following the end of a civil war. If a country returns to violence, we do not include the years of conflict. A state “returns” to the analysis if it establishes peace again, with our
study taking into account the new circumstances that define
the postwar state. We analyze civil wars that end via military
victory, negotiated settlement, and negotiated truce, since

Figure 1. Changes in Cuba’s de facto judicial independence,
1985–2006
settlements associated with all three forms of war termination can potentially call for the creation of power-sharing
measures.6
Dependent Variable

We employ Linzer and Staton’s measure of de facto judicial independence (2015) as our dependent variable. Linzer
and Staton develop the measure by extracting common information from eight extant indicators that measure judicial independence either directly or indirectly for different
groups of countries and time periods.7 The indicator is continuous but bounded between the values of 0 and 1. Values
closer to 1 reflect higher rates of de facto judicial independence while a value of 0 indicates a complete lack of independence.
In order to illustrate how this measure performs in practice, we provide figures reflecting the levels of de facto judicial independence in two countries that experienced civil
war. Cuba serves as our example of a country in which civil
war ended with a military victory for one side, and provisions for power sharing among rivals are absent. As Figure 1
illustrates, this post–civil war state remains at the low end
of Linzer and Staton’s judicial independence scale from
the 1959 revolution through the mid-1990s. Linzer and Staton suggest that the modest improvement in scores apparent after the turn of the century reflects the change of
leadership from Fidel Castro to his less-controlling brother,
Raul (Linzer and Staton 2015, 240). Yet, even with these
improvements, Cuba’s scores in terms of judicial independence remain comparable to other poorly performing countries such as Iran and Myanmar (Linzer and Staton 2015,
237–38).
Nicaragua lies at the other extreme. That country’s civil
war concluded on the basis of a series of negotiated accords
signed in 1989 and 1990, some of which provided for various
forms of power sharing. Following the agreements, as shown
in Figure 2, Nicaragua experienced a marked improvement
in its performance over a period of nearly ten years in terms
of de facto judicial independence. While the country did
not join the ranks of established democratic states with levels
of de facto judicial independence near the upper boundary
of “1,” such as the United States and Finland, the autonomy
6
Data on the distribution of the different types of power sharing across the
three forms of war termination appear in the online appendix.
7
Table 3 in the online appendix describes the operationalization of variables
and provides a list of the sources that Linzer and Staton (2015) use to construct
their indicator of judicial independence.
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Figure 2. Changes in Nicaragua’s de facto judicial independence, 1990–2006
of Nicaragua’s judiciary clearly grew in the years following
the power-sharing settlement that ended its civil war.
Key Explanatory Variables

Power sharing, our central explanatory variable, has four
distinct dimensions: political, military, territorial, and economic. We operationalize power sharing using different approaches. In initial analyses, we employ an aggregate measure of power sharing with values ranging from 0 to 4. A
value of 0 reflects the absence of any power-sharing dimensions adopted following civil war; a score of 4 indicates a
case of war termination in which all four of the potential
dimensions of power sharing are included as part of the settlement. In other tests we disaggregate the power-sharing
measure into its individual dimensions (political, military,
territorial, and economic) in order to assess the extent to
which any particular form of power sharing affects judicial
independence.
Control Variables

While we are most interested in the effect power sharing
has on judicial independence in the aftermath of civil war,
we recognize that it is not the only factor that shapes judicial
autonomy. In order to account for these other factors, we include control variables that we classify into three categories.
The first group of indicators includes conditions, beyond power sharing itself, that are associated with the recently concluded civil war. Measures within this category
are conflict duration and time since last settlement. We anticipate that wars of extended duration will encourage warweary actors to support enduring solutions to conflicts that
have proven challenging to resolve. The effect of this should
be to provide judges with more latitude to exercise their
own judgment as the executive and other actors hesitate
to act in a manner that could lead to the collapse of the
settlement. We include a measure of time since last settlement to account for the likelihood that, with the passage of
time, judges gain confidence in their ability to issue rulings
without incurring a negative reaction by other political actors, thus resulting in increasingly higher levels of judicial
independence.
Our second category of indicators consists of conditions
associated with the economic and political contexts in which
the postwar state finds itself. The variables that we include
here are democracy, GDP per capita, whether or not a state has
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had earlier experience with British colonialism, and the size of
the country’s population. We anticipate that democracies will
have a positive effect on judicial independence as such systems call for constitutional limits on the scope and use of
governmental powers. Wealthier countries, as reflected in
higher rates of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, typically
have less intense political competition (Lijphart 1977) and
should have sufficient resources to fund and protect an independent court system. The final variable we include indicates whether or not a state has experience with British colonialism. We anticipate that exposure to the British common
law system, with its tradition of respect for judicial independence, will produce postwar states that are better positioned
to build the rule of law (Mitchell, Ring, and Spellman 2013).
While each of the variables described within this category
thus far is hypothesized to enhance a country’s respect for
rule of law, we anticipate that population size will have a negative influence on our outcome of interest. We base this expectation on previous research that finds that large populations heighten the competition for a state’s scarce resources
and are thus associated with a stronger potential for instability (Keith 1999; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Carey,
Gibney, and Poe 2010; Cole and Ramirez 2013). We anticipate that judges will be more likely to find their autonomy
usurped in cases where large populations lead governments
to worry about maintaining control over their citizens.
The third category of variables we include in our analysis
is associated with the form and degree of international influence on the state emerging from civil war. These indicators
include whether or not a mediator sought to help resolve a
civil war, the presence or absence of peacekeepers following
the civil war, and the volume of official development assistance
per capita directed at the postwar state. We include these variables given the prevailing view that the greater the involvement and assistance provided by international actors, the
more likely it is that a postwar country will develop higher
levels of de facto judicial independence.
Also included in this category of variables is an indicator that reflects whether the year under analysis is 1999 or
later. We incorporate this variable based on the common understanding that it was during this period that the international community began to place a priority on promoting
the rule of law in post–civil war states. We consider this variable, along with official development assistance per capita and
peacekeepers, to be proxies for internationally led rule-of-law
reform efforts.
A final variable we include within this group of indicators
is a measure of the average regional level of judicial independence for each postwar state. We use this variable in order
to control for the possibility that states based in regions in
which de facto judicial independence is well established feel
pressure to meet those standards.
We provide summary statistics for all variables included in
our analysis as well as a table that includes details regarding the operationalization of the variables and original data
source(s).8
Model Specification

We employ a generalized least squares estimator (GLS). This
extension of the ordinary least squares method allows us
to account for dependencies that exist between prior and
current levels of judicial independence. To test for serial
8
Summary statistics appear in Table 1 of the online appendix. Table 3 in the
online appendix describes the operationalization of variables and identifies the
original data source(s).
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Table 1. The influence of aggregate power sharing on de facto judicial independence, 1948–2006

Variable
Aggregate power sharing
War duration
Time since last settlement
Democracy
GDP per capita
British colonialism
Population size
Mediation
Peacekeepers
ODA per capita
1999 or later
Regional rule of law

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

0.019***
(0.002)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.001*
(0.0001)
0.094***
(0.006)
0.04***
(0.005)
0.114***
(0.018)
–0.001
(0.003)
0.012
(0.007)
–0.012
(0.007)
–0.015
(0.009)
0.002
(0.002)
0.503***
(0.022)

0.019***
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
0.001*
(0.0001)
0.084***
(0.006)
0.036***
(0.005)
0.118***
(0.018)
0.0004
(0.003)
–0.012
(0.008)
–0.019**
(0.007)
–0.01
(0.009)
0.003
(0.003)
0.505***
(0.029)

0.021***
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.118***
(0.009)
0.046***
(0.005)
0.105***
(0.018)
0.006*
(0.003)
–0.012
(0.011)
0.014
(0.01)
–0.008
(0.013)
0.0001
(0.003)
0.483***
(0.024)

0.009*
(0.004)
0.01***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.0001)
0.098***
(0.008)
0.008
(0.006)
0.044*
(0.021)
–0.023***
(0.005)
–0.008
(0.012)
–0.006
(0.008)
–0.003
(0.009)
0.0001
(0.003)
0.351***
(0.042)
0.054***
(0.007)

0.018**
(0.006)
0.001
(0.002)
0.002***
(0.0001)
0.029***
(0.006)
0.013**
(0.004)
–0.006
(0.024)
0.012**
(0.004)
0.175***
(0.019)
–0.144***
(0.017)
–0.002
(0.005)
0.002
(0.002)
0.257***
(0.053)

Nongovernmental orgs.
Prewar rule of law

0.81***
(0.046)

Negotiated settlement
Military victory
Constant
N
AR1
Wald Chi2
p-value

–0.196**
(0.076)
1,124
0.91
2357.21
<0.001

–0.015
(0.008)
–0.06***
(0.01)
–0.159*
(0.077)
1,124
0.92
1608.62
<0.001

–0.402**
(0.102)
543
0.82
3321.79
<0.001

0.093
(0.091)
749
0.92
796
<0.001

–0.351***
(0.082)
656
0.97
860.12
<0.001

Note: (1) Standard errors appear in parentheses. (2) Statistical significance levels: * p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001. (3) Generalized least squares
regression.

correlation, we apply the Wooldridge test (2002, 282–83).9
We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the
residuals (p = 0.0001), thus confirming the need to include
an autoregressive term in the model. We employ an autoregressive model of order 1 (AR (1)) that expresses the
current observation as a linear function of previous observations (Box and Jenkins 1970). The autocorrelation term
is relatively high (0.91 for all countries), indicating that the
previous year’s measure of de facto judicial independence
has a considerable effect on the current measure.
Heteroskedasticity is also an issue of concern. The likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference
between the nested models at p < 0.001, indicating that a
model correcting for heteroskedasticity is a better fit for our
data.10

9

The results of the Wooldridge test appear in the online appendix.
The results of the likelihood ratio test and a figure plotting fitted values
versus residuals (Figure 1) appear in the online appendix. We address the issue of
heteroskedasticity by employing the “panels (heteroskedastic)” command option
available in Stata.
10

Results
The results of our initial test appear in Model 1 of Table 1.
We test the effect that our aggregate measure of power
sharing (the number of different types of power sharing
that appear in a civil war settlement) has on the level of
de facto judicial independence in post–civil war states. Our
expectation is that countries that adopt a range of powersharing provisions should have higher rates of de facto judicial independence in the years following the end of the
war than those states that adopt no or few types of power
sharing.
In this initial test we find that the coefficient associated with the aggregate power-sharing indicator is positively
signed and statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level.
This suggests that the total number of dimensions of power
sharing adopted in the aftermath of civil war plays a
meaningful role in enhancing a state’s respect for judicial
independence. A one-unit increase in the number of powersharing dimensions specified at civil war’s end results in an
increase in the mean level of de facto judicial independence
of 0.019.
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Figure 3. The effects of aggregate power sharing on de facto
judicial independence, fitted values plot

The control variables associated with the recently concluded civil war have a significant influence on the level
of judicial independence within a state. The coefficients associated with the indicators for conflict duration and time
since last settlement are, as anticipated, positive. In terms of
the category of indicators associated with the economic and
political context of the post–civil war state, we find that
previous level of democracy, GDP per capita, and experience
with British colonialism are in the expected direction and influential. The variable for population size, while having the
anticipated negative coefficient, fails to achieve statistical
significance.
The results concerning the factors reflective of international influences on the post–civil war state indicate
that these items, taken as a whole, do not play a role in
shaping levels of judicial independence. In this analysis,
the variables representative of mediation, peacekeepers, official
development assistance per capita, and the years 1999 or later all
fail to achieve significance. The only factor we include in this
category that proves influential is the measure of regional judicial independence. This suggests that the “neighborhood” in
which a state finds itself influences its willingness to respect
judicial independence.
The fact that many of the variables associated with international assistance to post–civil war states do not achieve statistical significance appears to reinforce the perspective that
the global community has had limited success in its efforts
to promote the rule of law. Yet, an alternative perspective
is equally plausible. It may be the case that international
assistance is most generous to those states that confront
the greatest challenges in their transitions from conflict to
peace; this is a claim advanced by Fortna (2004a, 2004b),
who finds that peacekeepers tend to be sent to the conflicts
that are the most intractable. If this proves to be the case, the
findings for the variables associated with international assistance may be an artifact of a selection effect and may thus
not accurately reflect the relationship between these indicators and the promotion of the rule of law. Although we are
aware of this possibility, given that our theoretical focus is
not on the role of the international community in helping
to build the rule of law, we limit our test concerning potential selection effects (discussed below) to the relationship
between power sharing and our dependent variable.
In order to consider the substantive effects of power sharing on de facto judicial independence, we generate a fitted values plot (Figure 3). Holding all control variables at
their mean (for continuous variables) or modal value (for
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dichotomous indicators), this graph demonstrates that each
additional dimension of power sharing adopted by a post–
civil war state increases the average level of de facto judicial
independence by a small increment.
Figure 3 indicates that, holding all other factors constant, a movement in the number of power-sharing dimensions from 0 to 4 increases the mean level of de facto judicial independence from 0.283 to 0.359, an improvement of
0.076. To evaluate the substantive meaning of this change,
we estimate the effect size in terms of the units of standard
deviations. In our sample, the standard deviation of de
facto judicial independence is 0.21. The change from 0
to 4 power-sharing dimensions thus is equivalent to the
mean change of 0.38 standard deviations (calculated as
0.019*4/0.21).11 Based on Cohen’s (1988) definition of effect size (Cohen’s d), this is an effect that is small to medium
in magnitude. In those cases in which there are only two dimensions of power sharing specified at war’s end, however,
the effect is small according to Cohen’s definition (0.019*2/
0.21 = 0.18).12
Including a high degree of power sharing in a settlement
(i.e., a settlement that calls for three or four of the different
forms of power sharing) does not, in and of itself, serve to elevate the average level of de facto judicial independence to
a score coterminous with high-functioning rule of law. The
positive effect that power sharing has on the average level
of de facto judicial independence is not meaningless however, especially when one considers that it is one of the only
variables that has a significant impact in Model 1 that is susceptible to policy manipulation.
Robustness and Endogeneity Tests

One objection that may be raised regarding our initial findings is that the analysis omits indicators reflecting the means
by which civil wars come to an end: military victory, negotiated settlement, or negotiated truce. Our focus on post–
civil war power sharing stands in contrast to research that
emphasizes the means by which a civil war has ended and
what that implies for the future governance of the state. Toft
(2010), for example, argues that countries in which a rebel
group achieves military victory are more likely to experience
long-term stability, democratic achievement, and prosperity.
In contrast, Gurses and Mason (2008) conclude that negotiated agreements serve as the most assured path to future
democratization. We focus on power sharing based on the
view that it provides more information regarding how the
postwar state will be governed. An emphasis on power sharing makes it feasible to identify cases that may share the
same form of civil war termination but experience very different outcomes in terms of how communities within the
postwar state relate to one another. Anomalous cases under
this approach, such as negotiated settlements that feature
little or no power sharing, are not grouped together with
those peace agreements that include a number of provisions
for sharing authority. Similarly, instances of military victory
in which the leaders of the postwar state opt for power sharing are not treated as comparable to the majority of such
cases in which no power sharing is in evidence.
In order to address concerns regarding the omission of
potentially significant variables, Model 2 replicates the original analysis with the addition of two new dichotomous
11
The value of 0.019 is based on the coefficient for the power-sharing variable
in Model 1.
12
Cohen (1988) employs 0.2 as the threshold for identifying a small effect
size, whereas 0.5 is the threshold for a medium effect size.
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indicators that identify those conflicts concluded either by
(1) negotiated settlement or (2) military victory.13 We assume
that power-sharing arrangements will have qualitatively similar effects on judicial independence across these two forms
of war termination. Our reasoning is that the ability of
judges to exercise judicial independence at the end of a
civil war is likely to be limited whether a civil war ends in
a military victory or via a negotiated settlement. In each instance, the executive is likely to wield considerable power,
with influence extending to the judicial branch of the state.
In light of this, power-sharing measures, whether agreed
to following a military victory or a negotiated conclusion
to a civil war, should help to balance or check executive
power, thus providing judges with greater autonomy following civil wars that end by either of these means. Judges are
also likely to find power-sharing measures that are designed
following a military victory reassuring from a security perspective. While this is particularly true for judges from a
minority group or on the losing side of the conflict, even
judges who are members of the group that emerges victorious are likely to feel more secure following an offer of power
sharing. In both instances, judges should see power sharing as a form of restraint or means of constraining at least
some of the types of violence that are characteristic of postconflict environments, including those that end in military
victory.
The results for Model 2 again point to a role for power
sharing in shaping the level of de facto judicial independence in post–civil war states. The aggregate power-sharing variable remains positive and statistically significant, with a coefficient value that replicates the findings for the original
model. For the two new variables, the results prove statistically significant only for military victory. The negative coefficient for this variable suggests that conflicts ended through
a victory for one side are less likely to promote de facto
judicial independence relative to those resolved by negotiated truces. This finding makes intuitive sense as conflicts terminated by military victory offer the greatest capacity for the conflict’s victors to influence or control the
judiciary.
In terms of the control variables included in the model,
two differences are apparent in comparison to the original
analysis. First, the coefficient for the war duration indicator
remains positive but is no longer statistically significant. Second, the peacekeeping variable retains its negative coefficient
but now proves a significant predictor of post–civil war judicial autonomy. As noted earlier, we are reluctant to attribute
much meaning to the results regarding peacekeepers, as
they may be attributable to selection effects.
Model 3 restricts the years under consideration to the
decade following the conclusion of the civil war. The logic
for including this analysis is that it limits the influence of
those cases in which the civil war ended relatively early in
our dataset and are thus represented in the analysis for
decades. As a result of this restriction, the number of cases
drops from 1,124 to 543.
For this analysis, we again employ an autoregressive term
in the model and control for heteroskedasticity. The results are similar to those that appear in Model 1. The aggregate power-sharing indicator remains statistically significant
and positive. The same control variables prove statistically
13
Negotiated truces serve as the omitted reference category. One complication that comes with performing this analysis is that there is evidence of multicollinearity between the war outcome variables and the power-sharing indicators.
Despite this concern, we present these results given the common practice of employing war outcome variables in studies of post–civil war states.

significant and are consistent in terms of the direction of
the coefficients. The sole exception is the measure of population size, which in this analysis proves statistically significant
and positive.
Models 4 and 5 provide further tests of the robustness of
our results. Model 4 includes a logged measure of the total number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) within a
state. Our expectation is that a larger number of NGOs reflects the vibrancy of civil society and the capacity of societal
groups to check the power of a state seeking to accumulate
power and influence. Model 5 includes a measure based on
the average level of rule of law in each country for three
years prior to the outbreak of civil war. We include this measure in order to account for the possibility that a country’s
previous performance in terms of respect for rule of law has
an influence on the state’s respect for judicial autonomy following the end of the war.14
These models again include the necessary controls for
both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The new variables included in these two tests each prove significant and
positive, offering support for the view that both the presence
of NGOs and a previous respect for rule of law have a beneficial influence on a country’s level of judicial independence
once the civil war has concluded. For both tests we also find
that the results concerning the relationship between aggregate power sharing and judicial independence remain positive
and significant.
For the model in which we include a logged measure
of NGO presence within the postwar state, two changes
are apparent in terms of control variables. First, the variable that represents time since the last settlement is no longer
significant. Second, the logged measure of GDP per capita
also lacks significance. For the model in which we incorporate the measure of prewar rule of law, there are three
notable changes. The indicator representing British colonialism no longer proves significant, while the mediation measure has a positive sign and attains significance. The peacekeeping indicator in this version of the test is negative and
significant.
These changes in the results regarding control variables
are not surprising given the widely varying number of cases
that are under consideration in these versions of the analyses. The fact that our key explanatory variable remains significant despite these changes in the model specification enhances our confidence in the robustness of our result.
As a further consideration of the robustness or our
results, we test our original model using an alternative
approach—linear regression with panel corrected standard errors. While both our original generalized least
squares model and this model address the issue of heteroskedasticity, the linear regression model uses a different procedure, a Prais-Winsten estimation, to correct
for autocorrelation. Our use of this model produces little substantive difference. The aggregate power-sharing variable remains statistically significant and in the anticipated direction. The same control variables are also
significant.15
Finally, we examine whether extensive power sharing
might be endogenous to the rule of law.16 Two potential
sources of endogeneity bias include reverse causality and
14
Because there are large numbers of missing values for the relevant measures, we opt to include these only as robustness tests.
15
The results of this model appear in Table 2 of the online appendix.
16
By extensive power sharing we mean war-ending agreements that include
three or four of the four different types of power sharing. We introduce this concept because the test of endogeneity that we employ requires a dichotomous indicator for power sharing for the selection stage of the model. As we note in the

C A R O L I N E A . H A RT Z E L L

selection bias. If reverse causality is at work, civil war states
with stronger rule-of-law systems somehow may be driven to
adopt extensive power sharing as part of their civil war settlements. On the face of it, such a relationship seems unlikely.
Weak rule of law is one of the factors that has been identified as contributing to the onset of civil war (Fearon 2010).
If relatively strong rule of law and meaningful constraints on
powerful actors existed, civil war adversaries would not feel
driven to devise means of limiting rivals’ power as a condition for ending the fighting. A more likely source of endogeneity bias where our analysis is concerned is selection or,
more specifically, self-selection by actors in some civil war
cases into settlements that include power-sharing measures.
If the same factor that motivates groups to agree to adopt
power sharing also has an effect on groups’ willingness to establish a rule-of-law system, an endogeneity problem might
exist.
To address concerns about potential endogeneity, we employ a two stage least squares model in order to determine
whether or not extensive power sharing can be treated as an
exogenous regressor. We employ linguistic fractionalization as
an instrumental variable for extensive power sharing.17 The
results of our test indicate that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that extensive power sharing can be treated as an
exogenous variable.18 The evidence does not suggest that
our findings are the result of a selection process.
Disaggregating Measures of Power Sharing

In Table 2 we alter our original model by replacing the variable for the aggregate level of power sharing with four dichotomous indicators. These variables indicate whether or
not a postwar state has employed a particular dimension of
power sharing: political, military, territorial, or economic.
This allows us to analyze whether any individual form of
power sharing shapes de facto judicial independence, either
positively or negatively. As with our tests that focused on
aggregate power sharing, we include corrections for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
In the initial test, Model 6 of Table 2, we find that all
four forms of power sharing have a statistically significant
effect on the levels of judicial independence in post–civil
war states. The indicators for political, territorial, and economic
power sharing are positively signed. Based on the Cohen’s
d statistic, the effect size of these variables, ordered from
smallest to greatest is the following: territorial power sharing
(0.09), political power sharing (0.11), and economic power sharing (0.33). The fact that each of these values is lower than
the Cohen’s d estimate for the aggregate power-sharing variable
(0.38) supports our argument that the influence of power
sharing on de facto judicial autonomy is greatest when multiple forms of power sharing are present.
In contrast, we find that military power sharing has a
negative coefficient; the Cohen’s d estimate for effect size

online appendix, we code an agreement as having provided for extensive power
sharing if it includes three or four of the types of power sharing.
17
Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity has been used to instrument for distrust (see,
for example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, et al. 1997). Our logic in employing it as an instrument for extensive power sharing is that civil war rivals that
exhibit a marked lack of trust will be more likely to agree to measures to check
one another’s power.
18
The results of our tests, which we generate using the ivreg2 package, suggest that linguistic fractionalization is not significantly related to power sharing
after controlling for other covariates. The low Chi-squared statistic from an endogeneity test further confirms this. See the online appendix for a summary of the
tests.
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Table 2. The influence of individual dimensions of power sharing on
de facto judicial independence, 1948–2006
Variable
Political power sharing
Military power sharing
Territorial power sharing
Economic power sharing
War duration
Time since last settlement
Democracy
GDP per capita
British colonialism
Population size
Mediation
Peacekeepers
ODA per capita
1999 or later
Regional rule of law

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

0.024***
(0.008)
–0.025***
(0.007)
0.016*
(0.008)
0.07***
(0.009)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.001**
(0.0001)
0.091***
(0.006)
0.037***
(0.005)
0.1***
(0.018)
–0.004
(0.003)
0.001
(0.008)
–0.001
(0.007)
–0.016
(0.009)
–0.001
(0.003)
0.489***
(0.031)

0.02**
(0.008)
–0.032***
(0.008)
–0.001
(0.009)
0.076***
(0.009)
0.0006
(0.002)
0.001*
(0.0006)
0.075***
(0.006)
0.03***
(0.005)
0.107***
(0.018)
0.001
(0.003)
–0.019*
(0.008)
–0.012
(0.007)
–0.009
(0.008)
0.001
(0.003)
0.511***
(0.034)
–0.02*
(0.009)
–0.081***
(0.011)
–0.093
(0.078)
1,124
0.92
1649.48
<0.001

0.023**
(0.009)
–0.012
(0.01)
–0.007
(0.01)
0.045***
(0.011)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.001*
(0.001)
0.099***
(0.009)
0.031***
(0.006)
0.107***
(0.021)
0.005
(0.004)
0.0001
(0.01)
–0.005
(0.008)
0.003
(0.012)
–0.004
(0.003)
0.598***
(0.049)

Negotiated settlement
Military victory
Constant
N
AR1
Wald Chi2
p-value

–0.097
(0.075)
1,124
0.9
1839.84
<0.001

–0.351**
(0.106)
543
0.88
1106.4
<0.001

Note: (1) Standard errors appear in parentheses. (2) Statistical significance levels: *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001. (3) Generalized least
squares regression.

in this instance is 0.12, which, like territorial power sharing
and political power sharing, is considered to be below the
Cohen’s d threshold of a “small effect” of 0.2. One possible explanation for this unanticipated, negative result for
military power sharing is that it speaks to the influence
that different types of security (i.e., physical security versus security defined in terms of continued access to power
and resources) and the types of power-sharing measures
that impact each type of security have on judicial independence. Joint control of the military by contending political actors may help to enhance their sense of physical security, but it appears that this form of power sharing is one that acts as a limit on the judiciary’s independence. Although we cannot be sure why military power sharing has this effect on judicial autonomy, it is possible that
judges may see a restructured and more inclusive military
of the type produced by military power sharing as providing the executive with more, rather than less, power over
the state’s security forces. If judges see this as strengthening
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the executive, rather than serving as a constraint, they may
be more reluctant to exercise judicial autonomy.
The findings for the control variables in this particular
test prove similar to those that appear in Model 1 of Table 1.
Factors associated with the civil war, as well as the economic
and political context of the post–civil war state, prove influential in shaping levels of judicial independence. International factors do not prove influential although, once
again, the indicator reflecting the level of judicial independence within the region of the world in which the postwar
state is located is significant and the coefficient positively
signed.
Employing the approach we used for tests of the aggregate measure of power sharing, Model 7 of Table 2 controls for the form of war termination.19 In this instance,
both the political and economic power-sharing variables are positively signed and prove statistically significant. Also in keeping with the initial analysis, the military power-sharing variable
has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant. The
sole divergence from the original finding is that the territorial
power-sharing variable now has a negative coefficient but fails
to achieve significance. In terms of the variables accounting
for forms of war termination, both the indicators for military
victory and negotiated settlement prove statistically significant
and negatively signed.
As a final means of considering the relationship between
power sharing and rule of law in post–civil war states, we
focus on the individual dimensions of power sharing while
limiting the analysis to the first ten years after the end of civil
war. This test, Model 8 in Table 2, parallels that of Model 3.
Here we find some notable differences in comparison to
the results seen in Model 6. Only two forms of power sharing now appear to have a statistically significant influence
on the rule of law. Holding all other influences constant,
political power sharing enhances the level of judicial independence, and economic power sharing again proves to be the most
influential form of power sharing. While the coefficient for
military power sharing remains negative, it is no longer statistically significant.

Liberia: Power Sharing and the Rule of Law
Our quantitative analyses suggest that the adoption of extensive power sharing has had a positive effect on the development of the rule of law following civil war. We further
explore this relationship by examining the case of Liberia,
which is well predicted by our statistical model.20
Following years of civil war, the Accra Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2003, brought an end to
the armed conflict in Liberia.21 Once considered one of the
most prosperous countries in Africa, Liberia had become,
after years of fighting, one of the poorest countries in the
world. A team from the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) described the country’s formal legal system
in the following manner:
There is an almost unanimous distrust of Liberia’s
courts and a corresponding collapse of the rule of law.
19
As we note in our discussion of Model 2 in Table 1, multicollinearity is apparent between the war outcome and power-sharing variables. We opt to present
this analysis given the common practice of including war outcome indicators in
quantitative studies of post–civil war states.
20
The standard deviation for our initial model’s residuals was 0.18. In the case
of Liberia it is very close to zero (0.05), demonstrating that the model predicted
the values for Liberia particularly well.
21
Several efforts previously were made to end the fighting in Liberia, with
one, the 1996 Abuja Accord, producing a two-year period of peace following the
election of the warlord Charles Taylor as president.

Liberia’s Constitution provides for an Anglo-American
legal system, but in reality, there is no effective separation of powers, a limited understanding of the
principles of transparency and accountability, little
knowledge of contemporary notions of human rights,
limited access to legal advice and defense counsel, and
unconscionable delays. Taylor’s government withheld
salaries from judges, prosecutors, court staff, police,
and prison officers for 2.5 years. Judgment, freedom,
and even life itself were often sold to the highest bidder (ILAC 2003, viii, cited in [Lubkemann, Isser, and
Chapman 2011, 79]).
The CPA, agreed to by the three warring factions (the
Government of Liberia [GOL], Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy [LURD], and the Movement
for Democracy and Elections in Liberia [MODEL]), as well
as the representatives of a number of political parties and
civil society organizations, enumerated various steps in the
peace process and provided for the creation of the National
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The NTGL,
whose mandate consisted of reestablishing functioning government authority and preparing for national elections to
be held in 2005, consisted of an executive branch, led by
Chairman Gyude Bryant, who was elected to the position at
the Accra Conference that produced the CPA, and an interim parliament, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA). Provisions of Liberia’s 1984 constitution as
well as various laws that were inconsistent with the CPA were
suspended (Cook 2010). This allowed the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) to function with
representatives of the executive and legislative branches selected exclusively from the parties to the conflict and civil
society rather than through elections (Peace Accords Matrix
2017).
Political power-sharing measures were a central component of the CPA. The parties to the CPA were allocated positions within the executive and legislative branches, with
leadership of twenty-one ministries in the executive branch
distributed among the GOL, LURD, MODEL, political parties and civil society, and seats in the seventy-six-seat National Transitional Legislative Assembly distributed among
the same groups as well as a representative from each of
Liberia’s fifteen counties. The existing judiciary was vacated
upon the inauguration of the NTGL, with new members of
the Supreme Court appointed by Chairman Bryant and confirmed by the NTGL (Pham 2004). The CPA also called for
military power sharing in the form of the establishment of
new armed forces to be constructed with regard given to the
“national balance.” Finally, economic power sharing was also
employed, with positions as heads of public corporations distributed among parties to the settlement.
Historically speaking, one of the principal factors undermining the functioning of the rule of law in Liberia has
been the executive branch’s influence over the judiciary. Although the country’s constitution provides for a system of
checks and balances among the branches of government,
in practice “Liberian presidents have wielded exceptional,
sometimes extraconstitutional powers” (Cook 2010, 35). A
history of repeated “executive interference in the judiciary
and manipulation of the courts to serve political aims” damaged both the functioning and reputation of the formal judicial system (Lubkemann et al. 2011, 76).
The long-standing imbalance of power between the executive and the judiciary in Liberia suggests that a restructuring of this relationship should have been an important
component of a postconflict rule-of-law reform program. As
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evaluations of the international community’s investment in
rule-of-law programming in Liberia make clear, though, efforts to address executive-judiciary relations were not a focus of externally led reform efforts. Sannerholm (2007), for
example, observes that, although a special rule-of-law component was created within the United Nations Mission in
Liberia (UNIMIL), it “focused on high-profile areas such as
ensuring women’s rights, training judges in human rights
sensitivity, and ensuring the rights of juvenile offenders,”
rather than being “concerned with how the emerging state
in Liberia should be organized, or how the relationship between the state and citizens should best be regulated” (87).
An evaluation conducted for the United States Agency for
International Development of three years of rule-of-law programming concludes that the efforts appeared to “have had
limited impact on citizens’ access to fair, effective, and efficient justice,” an outcome attributed to factors ranging from
a lack of capacity in the country to the “lack of a focused
rule-of-law strategy within [the] postconflict Liberian context” (Henderson, Jakosa, and Gibson 2009, 2).
Although international rule-of-law reform programs
failed to address the need to rebalance power between the
executive and the judiciary in Liberia, the power-sharing
measures included in the country’s civil war settlement arguably went some way toward addressing this issue. During the two-year period the NTGL was in place, for example, Gyude Bryant exercised much less influence over the
legislature and judiciary than had previous Liberian presidents. Limits on the Chairman’s power stemmed from the
fact that, rather than the executive, it was the parties to
the CPA who filled the positions of ministers, heads of public corporations, and autonomous agencies. And, although
the Chairman nominated the chairs and members of the
commissions, his choices had to be approved by the NTLA
(Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006).
Following national elections in October and November
2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf took office as president of
Liberia on January 16, 2006. President Sirleaf informally
continued the practice of political power sharing by including former opposition members in her cabinet. The practice also extended to other branches of government, with
Sirleaf nominating Kabineh Janneh, the former NTGL justice minister and leading member of the LURD rebel group,
as a Supreme Court justice (Cook 2010). Although the executive’s constitutional authority to appoint government officials at almost all levels continues to limit the development
of a fully effective system of checks and balances in Liberia,
the Political Constraints Index provides some evidence of
growing restraints operating on politically dominant actors
in Liberia. The measure identifies the degree of constraints
on policy change using data on the number of independent
veto points in the political system (executive, legislative, judicial, and subfederal branches of government) and the distribution of political preferences both within and across the
branches (Henisz 2000, 4). Scored on a scale of 0 to 1,
higher scores reflect a higher number of constraints, which
are assumed to promote stability. Liberia, which registered 0
on the Political Constraints Index from 1960 through 2005,
scored 0.08672 for the years 2006–2011, rising to 0.121128
in 2012, and then to 0.678872 for the years 2013–2016, with
the latter constituting a political constraint score on par with
that of Chile.
What has this meant for the rule of law in Liberia?
Figure 4 illustrates the trajectory of the country’s rule of law
over a period of twenty-five years, beginning in 1985, four
years before the civil war broke out, and ending in 2010,
seven years after the end of the armed conflict. The figure,
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Figure 4. Changes in Liberia’s de facto judicial independence, 1985–2010
which displays Linzer and Staton’s measure of judicial independence for each of these years, shows minimal variation in
the measure for the years 1985–2002, with a pronounced upward shift in the measure of de facto judicial independence
beginning to take place in 2003. In 2010, Liberia registered
a judicial independence score of 0.4282.22
Much remains to be done to build a rule-of-law system in Liberia that is accessible to all, equitable in its
treatment of all of the country’s citizens, high performing, and legitimate. A recent assessment of Liberia’s judiciary concludes that it still faces “serious shortcomings
in terms of capacity and infrastructure,” functions “under
outdated laws and legal frameworks,” lacks qualified personnel, insufficient funding, and that corruption remains
endemic (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2016, 10).
Despite these significant weaknesses, it is important to acknowledge that Liberia has made some progress in terms
of strengthening the rule of law since the end of the civil
war. The use of power-sharing measures, both formally as
stipulated by the CPA and informally by the Sirleaf administration, appears to have helped secure a degree of independence for the judiciary.
Turning to the causal mechanisms, it is clear that power
sharing acted as a restraint on presidential power. Although
we did not find any statements by members of the Liberian
judiciary attributing limits on the power of the executive to
power sharing, the upward shift in Liberia’s scores on the
Political Constraints Index that began to take place during
the NTGL, in conjunction with the rising score on the judicial independence index at the same time, indicates that
some factor had begun to provide judges with more space
within which to exercise their own political judgment. The
only factor we have been able to identify as capable of providing a meaningful type of check or balance on the executive in the tumultuous period that followed the end of the
war in Liberia is the power-sharing measures agreed to at
the war’s end.
Less clear is the impact that power sharing had on political actors’ sense of security and, through that, on judicial independence in Liberia. We were not able to find any
evidence that judges credited power sharing with providing them with an enhanced sense of security, nor that a
greater sense of security provided them with more freedom
to decide cases on the basis of the law. It does seem likely
that Liberia’s civil war adversaries would not have remained
22
Liberia’s de facto judicial independence score in 2006, the last year included in our analysis, is 0.2614.
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committed to the peace, much less acted with the restraint
necessary for the enhancement of the rule of law, had they
not been reassured that a rival would be unable to use the
power of the state to threaten their lives and interests.23
Power sharing provided Liberian opponents with enough of
a sense of security to keep them committed to the NTGL
and to allow for a peaceful transfer of power to Sirleaf’s
government. Although we were not able to discern what
effect this may have had on the judiciary, it seems reasonable to assume that such an environment would have eased
judges’ worries about any potential repercussions that might
have followed the growing exercise of judicial autonomy on
their parts.

Discussion and Conclusion
Countries emerging from civil war face serious challenges
in their efforts to put in place functioning rule-of-law systems. Obstacles confronting rule-of-law reform efforts include a paucity of resources, feelings of insecurity and a
lack of trust among former antagonists, and the reluctance
of rulers to accept constraints on their power. Seeking to
help postconflict countries build the rule of law, the international community has sought to provide resources for the
(re)construction of institutions associated with the judicial
sector. Fewer efforts, however, have been expended on dealing with the latter two issues. Rather than helping to build
rule-of-law institutions appropriate for an environment in
which insecurity and a corresponding determination on the
part of former armed rivals to control the levers of state
power are prevalent, international actors have attempted to
reproduce the types of rule-of-law structures that exist in
the West. The result of these efforts has been, it is generally
agreed, less than successful.
This study has sought to identify an alternative means by
which postwar states may construct stronger rule-of-law systems. We posit that power-sharing institutions have the potential to play a helpful role in this process by allaying adversaries’ feelings of insecurity and by providing a set of checks
and balances that constrain political actors. Power-sharing
institutions are more likely to accomplish this, we argue, in
those instances in which rival groups create an array of these
measures. The results of our empirical analysis provide support for this argument. All other things being equal, countries that adopt a range of power-sharing institutions have
higher de facto judicial independence scores following the
end of their respective civil wars than those countries that
include no or few such measures.
With the mean rule-of-law score for countries with extensive power sharing in our sample at 0.376, it is clear
that the adoption of these types of mechanisms has not
produced high-functioning rule-of-law systems on par with
those of consolidated democracies such as the United States
and Japan, countries whose judicial independence scores
in 2010 were 0.9859 and 0.9838, respectively. Nevertheless,
our results suggest that civil war adversaries’ decision to
share power as part of a civil war settlement represents a
shift in exogenous political conditions resulting in an increase in judicial independence in the years following the
end of intrastate conflict. Whether the resulting growth in
judicial independence is stable enough to build a stronger
23
The United Nations Mission in Liberia, the peacekeeping force established
in September 2003 to monitor the CPA, played an important role in providing
for security and stability in Liberia. What is not clear is whether, and if so to what
extent, the security presence of UNMIL served to influence rival elites to refrain
from using power in an instrumental fashion.

and more liberally oriented rule of law, particularly once
power-sharing arrangements expire, is a question that merits further investigation. Also worth exploring from a policy perspective is whether international rule-of-law programs
designed to build on the degree of judicial independence
secured by power sharing might have more success in generating positive rule-of-law impacts than those that have attempted to replicate Western rule-of-law systems.
Including a number of different types of power-sharing
measures as part of civil war peace settlements does not guarantee the establishment of a high-functioning system of judicial independence and rule of law. Nonetheless, the fact that
institutions designed to help stabilize the peace can have a
positive impact on the rule of law in countries where rule
by the gun recently prevailed should not be discounted as
an achievement. Rivals in countries emerging from civil war
have a unique set of concerns. Recognizing that reality and
providing support for institutional changes that take these
concerns into account can help to lay the foundations for a
stronger rule-of-law system.

Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available at the International
Studies Quarterly data archive.
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